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ABSTRACT The spread of online misinformation has gained mainstream attention in recent
years. This paper approaches this phenomenon from a cultural evolution and cognitive
anthropology perspective, focusing on the idea that some cultural traits can be successful
because their content taps into general cognitive preferences. This research involves 260
articles from media outlets included in two authoritative lists of websites known for pub-
lishing hoaxes and ‘fake news’, tracking the presence of negative content, threat-related
information, presence of sexually related material, elements associated to disgust, minimally
counterintuitive elements (and a particular category of them, i.e., violations of essentialist
beliefs), and social information, intended as presence of salient social interactions (e.g.,
gossip, cheating, formation of alliances), and as news about celebrities. The analysis shows
that these features are, to a different degree, present in most texts, and thus that general
cognitive inclinations may contribute to explain the success of online misinformation. This
account can elucidate questions such as whether and why misinformation online is thriving
more than accurate information, or the role of ‘fake news’ as a weapon of political propa-
ganda. Online misinformation, while being an umbrella term covering many different phe-
nomena, can be characterised, in this perspective, not as low-quality information that spreads
because of the inefficiency of online communication, but as high-quality information that
spreads because of its efficiency. The difference is that ‘quality’ is not equated to truthfulness
but to psychological appeal.
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At the beginning of 2018, more than half of the worldpopulation had Internet access (Wikipedia, 2018). InEurope and North America, nine-in-ten adults use the
Internet daily. This figure goes to practically ten-in-ten when
considering individuals between 18 and 50 years old (Pew
Research Centre, 2018a). In parallel, the growth rate of social
media has been extraordinary. Facebook, opened to public in
2006, declared 2,20 billion monthly users worldwide twelve years
after. In the first quarter of 2018, Facebook reported 185 million
‘daily active users’ in the US and Canada, which is roughly the
85% of the population between 18 and 69 years old (Facebook,
2018). An increasing fear that the new information ecosystem
would prove fertile ground for the spread of misinformation,
hoaxes, and false or ‘fake’ news, has accompanied the diffusion of
Internet and social media, especially in recent years.
I approach the spread of online misinformation from a cultural
evolution and cognitive anthropology perspective. In particular, I
draw on the idea that certain general evolved cognitive pre-
ferences make some cultural traits more likely to succeed with
respect to others, making them more appealing, attention-
grabbing and memorable (Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004; Morin,
2016). The spread of online misinformation can be ascribed to
several different reasons, but one is that misinformation has the
obvious advantage, with respect to correct information, of not
being constrained by reality. We can shape misinformation to be
appealing, attention-grabbing and memorable more than what we
can do with real information. Notice this does not need to be a
conscious process: creators of fake news can deliberately tailor
their content to be appealing, but it could also be that, amongst
the misinformation websites, the ones that publish non-attractive
content are rarely visited and they end up disappearing.
To illustrate this possibility, I analysed the content of 260
articles, published in 26 websites included in two authoritative
lists of ‘suspect’ outlets, for the presence of seven factors likely to
enhance the cultural success of narratives (a methodology similar
to Stubbersfield et al., 2017), plus a more general assessment of
the content as negative, positive, or neutral.
A general preference for negative content has been identified in
cultural evolutionary studies as a feature favoring the recall of
stories, with negative events being better recalled than positive
ones, and ambiguous events being more likely to be transformed
in negative events when the stories are reported (Bebbington
et al., 2017). Information framed negatively (‘When civil litigation
cases go to trial, 60% of plaintiffs lose, winning no money, and
often having to pay attorney fees’) is considered more truthful
that information framed positively (‘When civil litigation cases go
to trial, 40% of plaintiffs succeed and win money’) even when the
content is exactly the same (Fessler et al., 2014). These experi-
mental results are paralleled by similar findings in real-life cul-
tural dynamics. English language literary fiction has become less
‘emotional’ in the last two centuries (i.e., books contain less words
that are associated to emotions), and this trend is entirely driven
by a decrease in positive emotion content, while the number of
words associated to negative emotions remained roughly constant
(Morin and Acerbi, 2017). A negative bias in news reporting has
been documented repeatedly (see e.g., Niven, 2001; Hester and
Gibson, 2003; van der Meer et al., 2018). Various hypotheses have
been put forward to explain why a negative bias could be adap-
tive. To start with, there is a fundamental asymmetry between
negative and positive events, with avoidance of dangers having
greater effect on fitness than the pursuit of advantages (Rozin and
Royzman, 2001). Some researchers have also suggested that
negative information could be adaptive in fictional narratives (as
misinformation can be considered): according to the hypothesis
that artistic expressions provide hypothetical scenarios to
simulate social interactions (Mar and Oatley, 2008), simulating
negative events would be more beneficial than simulating positive
ones (Clasen, 2007).
The first specific cognitive preference considered is for threat-
related information. Blaine and Boyer (2018) proposed that the
preference for negative content described above is not related to
negativity per se, but it is targeted to threat-related information,
which would explain its evolutionary rationale. In addition, they
showed that the threats described in the rumours do not need to
be directly relevant to the individuals to enhance the success of
the rumours. This seems to be indeed the case for the majority of
online misinformation, where threats and hazards are, in fact,
hardly credible (the fifth most successful ‘fake news’ on Facebook
in 2017 was titled Morgue employee cremated by mistakes while
taking a nap, and was liked, shared, or commented more than one
million times according to BuzzFeed, 2017, one of the sources
used for the articles sampled in this research).
The second element coded was the presence of sexually related
information. While I am not aware of any specific study in cul-
tural evolution dealing with the hypothesis that sexually related
information enhances the success of narratives (but see Mesoudi
et al., 2006, that showed that ‘gossip’ content, which involved a
sexual affair between a student and her professor, was better
transmitted than non-social content, see also below), references to
sexual activities are intuitively common in popular press. Sexual
themes were present in five out of ten of the top-10 ‘fake news’ by
Facebook engagement in the same BuzzFeed list (BuzzFeed, 2017)
On the other side, perhaps contrary to intuition, the effect of the
presence of erotic scenes, nudity, and sexual innuendos for the
success of movies (Cerridwen and Simonton, 2009) or adver-
tisements (Wirtz et al., 2018) is unclear.
I then considered a preference for elements associated to dis-
gust. A disgust-bias is probably, in cultural evolution, the most
well-studied factor favouring the success of narratives. Psycho-
logical research shows that disgust is especially provoked by
information about contaminated food, usually by animals
(everybody will have heard the decades old story about the pre-
sence of worm meat or rats in McDonald’s hamburgers) or body
products. Diseases, mutilations, body products in general, and
sexual acts considered ‘unnatural’ are also primary disgust evo-
kers. The fact that disgust elicitors are often associated with
pathogens and infectious threats explains why disgust-related
information grabs our attention (Curtis, 2007). Urban legends,
rumours, and children stories have often motifs that elicit disgust.
Analysing a sample of urban legends, Stubbersfield et al. (2017)
found that 13% of them contained disgust-evoking content.
Heath et al. (2001) similarly found that being high in a ‘disgust-
scale’ (a quantitative measure of how disgusting is a story) was a
good predictor of online success of urban legends. Stories with
elements associated to disgust were shown to be more successful,
in an experimental setting, than the same stories without those
elements (Eriksson and Coultas, 2014) even though transcultural
differences have been also found (Eriksson et al., 2016).
Another cognitive preference widely studied is for minimally
counterintuitive (MCI) content. MCI content refers to content
that violate (few) intuitive expectations about basic properties of
ontological categories. For example, supernatural beings behave
in many expected, non-surprising, ways (they are jealous, they
can get angry, etc.) but they also breach other expectations (they
may be immortal, they may read our thoughts, etc.). It has been
proposed that entities that violate few intuitive expectations
represent a cognitive optimum, being at the same time memor-
able, because of the violations, and still allowing making infer-
ences, because of the confirmed intuitions (Boyer, 1994). This
cognitive advantage may determine the success of certain cultural
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traits: Norenzayan et al. (2006) found for example that, amongst
Grimm brothers’ folktales, the successful ones (the like of Cin-
derella or Hansel and Gretel) tend to have around two or three
counterintuitive elements, whereas unsuccessful folktales are
more or less uniformly distributed amongst all possible numbers
of counterintuitive elements.
The analysis also focused on a specific category of minimally
counterintuitive elements, that is, elements concerning the vio-
lation of ordinary essentialist thinking. Essentialist thinking refers
broadly to the intuition that living beings, contrary to artifacts,
have a hidden essence that does not change, and that is respon-
sible for their physical appearance and for their behaviour (Keil,
1992). It has been suggested that the opposition to genetically
modified organisms can stem, among other things (such as
intuitive disgust, or breach of intuitive teleological thinking that
results in the idea that we should not ‘interfere with nature’),
from a violation of our intuitive essentialist expectations (Blancke
et al., 2015).
The last element coded was related to social interactions and
gossip. Given their importance for human beings, possibly in
relation to The Machiavellian intelligence/social brain hypothesis
(Mesoudi et al., 2006), it is not surprising that the presence of
elements related to social interactions have been considered a
factor enhancing the cultural success of narratives. Previous
studies have differentiated between ‘social’ content, defined as
containing ‘everyday interactions and relationship’, and ‘gossip’
content, defined as containing ‘particularly intense and salient
social interactions and relationships’ (Mesoudi et al. 2006; Stub-
bersfield et al., 2015, 2017). In my study, the ‘social’ category
refers instead to the latter as, from an explorative analysis,
practically all the articles in the sample had some form of
‘everyday interactions and relationship’. Thus, the ‘social’ cate-
gory here is similar to the ‘gossip’ category in those studies. In
addition, the articles contained actual material about celebrities
like pop stars, politicians, and actors, so I also quantified how
many news were reporting this kind of social information with
respect to news regarding unknown people: this is coded as
‘presence of celebrities’.
Finally, since that the diffusion of online misinformation has
been considered especially worrying when related to politics (see
discussion in Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017), I additionally coded
whether the articles concerned political matters or not.
Methods
I used two authoritative lists of outlets known for publishing
hoaxes and misinformation, provided by the websites Snopes.com
and BuzzFeed. The two websites were chosen because they had
been already used in other comparable analyses (see
e.g., Stubbersfield et al., 2017; Pew Research Centre, 2018b;
Vosoughi et al., 2018). I excluded other lists, such as the ones
produced by FactCheck.org and PolitiFact, as they only take into
account (mainly US) politics. Both lists used were updated in
2017. I excluded from the lists outlets that, at the time of data
collection, were not active or had manifestly changed their
activity, e.g., they were not publishing anything recognisable as
news. I also excluded few outlets that were not in English lan-
guage, obtaining a final sample of 26 websites.
I extracted 10 articles from each of the 26 websites, for a total
of 260 articles. The articles chosen were the ones appearing
prominently in the homepage of the websites. To collect the
articles, the pages were visually scanned starting from the top-left
corner, moving toward right and, when reached the border of the
page, the procedure was repeated at a lower level, until 10 titles
linking to full articles were found. This procedure may have
selected different kinds of articles from different outlets, as some
websites had in evidence ‘trending’ recent articles, others the
overall ‘most viewed’ articles, and others again what they con-
sidered the actual ‘last’ news. Keeping this into account, this
simple procedure should have picked the articles that were con-
sidered as more appealing by the websites themselves. The texts
were extracted in August and September 2018.
Each text was manually coded for the features described in the
Introduction. The texts were coded as having a general positive,
negative, or neutral content, and for the presence or absence of
the following specific content: (i) threat-related information, (ii)
sexually related information, (iii) elements associated to disgust,
(iv) minimally counterintuitive (MCI) elements, (v) anti-
essentialist elements, (vi) social information, and (vii) presence
of celebrities. In addition, the articles were coded for whether or
not they concerned political matters. Supplementary Table S1
summarises the elements that were coded, and the short
descriptions used and provided to the additional coders.
The articles were coded by the author and by four additional
independent coders. Each of them was provided with 50 ran-
domly selected articles. The agreement among coders was high
and consistent, with 85, 87, 89 and 86% of the overall elements
coded in the same way (cumulative 87 ± 1.7). Supplementary
Table S2 shows the agreements by category. The general content
was the only category with three possible outcomes (positive,
negative, or neutral) so in Supplementary Table S2 is reported
also a figure on a broader version of the agreement, failing only
when texts were coded as positive versus negative or vice versa
(this broader agreement was not used in the calculation of the
overall agreements). In this case, only 1 out of 200 articles coded
by the additional coders differed from the main coding.
Results
The general content was, for the majority of the articles, negative.
Out of 260, 128 articles had a negative content (49%), 110 a
neutral (42%) and only 22 (9%) a positive one (see Fig. 1). In
other words, negative articles were between five and six times
more frequent than articles with a positive content.
The majority of articles, 224 of them (86%), contained infor-
mation that could be traced back to at least one of the seven
specific elements of content analysed. The majority of articles had
one or two cognitive preferences (81 and 82 articles, respectively,
representing cumulatively the 63% of the total). 31 articles (12%)
had three cognitive preferences, 24 (9%) had four, and 4 (1.5%)
had five. Only 2 articles had more than five coded elements (one
article had six and one had seven).
Fig. 1 General emotional content of the articles. Proportion of articles coded
as having a negative, neutral and positive content
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Threat-related information was present in 74 articles out of 260
(28%) and it represented, behind social information or celebrities,
which I will consider below, the most diffuse element (see Fig. 2).
Sexually related information came after, and they were present in
45 articles (17%). 40 articles (15%) were coded as containing
elements evoking disgust. 33 articles (13%) had content that was
classified as containing MCI elements. The majority of MCI
elements present were more specifically violating intuitive
essentialist beliefs, with 21 out of 33 articles being coded as such
(making for the 8% of the total articles, and 64% of the articles
containing MCI elements in general). Social information and
presence of celebrities were the two most common elements, and
they were found in in 50 and 48% of the articles, respectively.
There are few things to notice when looking at the co-
occurrence of the preferences (see Table 1). Threat, sexual and
disgust-related information tended, not surprisingly, to be found
together. However, there is an asymmetry between threat-related
information, on one side, and sexual and disgust-related infor-
mation on the other. The majority of articles that contained
threat information (57%) did not contain also sexual or disgust-
eliciting elements. On the contrary, only the 27% of articles coded
as containing sexual information, and the 13% of articles coded as
containing element evoking disgust, were not coded as also
containing at least one of the other two elements. Second, both
social information and presence of celebrities are evenly dis-
tributed among the other categories, but while the total amount of
both if similar, articles about celebrities tend to be associated less
frequently with others factors.
Finally, 40% of the articles (105 out of 260) were identified as
concerning political matters. Figure 3 shows the proportion of
cognitive preferences for political and non-political articles.
Notice that the majority of articles coded as regarding ‘celebrities’
were in fact about well-known political figures. Articles about
non-political celebrities were 43, that is, around the 16% of the
entire sample. The two categories ‘social’ and ‘celebrities’ are
overrepresented in political articles, whereas the other cognitive
factors are more present in non-political articles. Political articles
identified as containing any category other than ‘social’ or
‘celebrities’ were 20 out of 105 (19%), whereas this figure was 88
out of 155 (57%) for non-political ones.
Discussion
Overall, the analysis presented here suggests that one of the
factors that could explain the success of online misinformation is
that it appeals to general cognitive preferences. Consistent with
previous research, ‘suspect’ articles were found heavily leaning
towards negative content. The various cognitive factors coded
were present to a different degree. Descriptions of threats were
Fig. 2 Cognitive preferences. Proportion of articles in which each of the
specific cognitive preference was coded
Table 1 Co-occurrence of cognitive preferences
Threat Sex Disgust MCI Anti-essentialism Social Celebrity
Threat 1 0.33 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.53 0.19
Sex 0.56 1 0.62 0.27 0.24 0.58 0.24
Disgust 0.68 0.7 1 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.1
MCI 0.48 0.36 0.39 1 0.64 0.42 0.30
Anti-essentialism 0.52 0.52 0.61 1 1 0.29 0.14
Social 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.05 1 0.57
Celebrity 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.59 1
Frequency of cognitive preferences appearing together in the same article. Results are rounded to the second decimal
Fig. 3 Cognitive preferences in political and non-political articles. Proportion
of articles, divided in ‘political’ and ‘non-political’, in which each of the
specific cognitive preference was coded
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prominent, with almost 30% of the articles containing them.
Elements eliciting disgust and sexual details were also present, but
they were generally co-occurring with threat-related information
(the single most successful ‘fake news’ in Facebook in 2017 is a
good example of this combination: Babysitter transported to
hospital after inserting a baby in her vagina, BuzzFeed, 2017). An
interpretation is that disgust and sexual details were mainly used
to produce threatening narratives, giving some support to the
hypothesis that threat-related information would have a primary
role amongst the factors that make stories culturally successful
(Blaine and Boyer, 2018), but further research is needed to sub-
stantiate this link. On the other side, elements eliciting disgust
and sexual details seem rarely present in mainstream reporting,
on the contrary of threats (accidents, violent acts, etc.). In this
respect, while the absolute amount of threat-related information
in online misinformation is higher than the absolute amount of
disgust- and sexually-related information, it is possible that the
relative importance of disgust and sex, when compared with true
information, will be higher. An explicit comparison with truthful
reporting (an obvious extension of this study) could address this
question.
Articles with minimally counterintuitive elements were less
common than articles with threat-, sex-, and disgust-related
information. In addition, violations of intuitions that could be
considered ‘supernatural’ in the common sense of the term were
even less, making for around 5% of the articles (the other articles
consisted in violations of essentialist intuitions, see below). This is
partly surprising, giving the importance given in the cultural
evolution literature to MCI elements. The result is consistent with
the analysis of Stubbersfield et al. (2017) that also found, ana-
lysing contemporary urban legends, a similar low number of MCI
elements (only 6% of the urban legends they analysed contained
MCI elements). On the other side, it could simply be that online
misinformation needs to maintain some level of credibility, so
that it is a sensible strategy (whether conscious or not) to limit the
number of stories about aliens and Bigfoots. Interestingly, more
than 60% of the MCI elements coded consisted in violations of
essentialist intuitions, such as ‘experimental’ transplants of organs
from a species to another, inter-species sex, chirurgical sex
changes, or clones and GMOs.
Social information and presence of celebrities were the ele-
ments quantitatively most important. Two remarks need to be
done. First, although in experimental conditions social informa-
tion can be clearly separated by non-social one (Mesoudi et al.,
2006), the task proved more difficult when using real content, and
‘social’ was the category with the lower inter-coder agreement
(see Supplementary Table S2). As for the categories above, in
addition, one should compare this result with the proportion of
social information in a sample of ‘real’ news, where it would also
seem prominent. Second, the high number of articles coded as
concerning ‘celebrities’ is linked to the presence of political arti-
cles. For the large majority, celebrities were indeed politicians,
and articles about actors, musicians, sport-stars were around 16%,
a figure comparable with the articles about sex or eliciting disgust,
and lower than the articles containing description of threats,
going against the common intuition of popular press being
obsessed with celebrities. The relatively low proportion of articles
concerning celebrities could also be due, as mentioned above for
MCI elements, to a trade-off between cognitive attraction and
plausibility. Many stories with high levels of disgust or threat-
information, for example, would de be scarcely credible (or
quickly debunked) when associated to public figures.
The majority of articles (63% of the total) contained 1 or 2
factors, an amount largely compatible, again, with the finding of
Stubbersfield et al. (2017) for contemporary urban legends. If it is
sensible both that too many factors would make narratives too
convoluted and that different factors could conflict with each
other, it is also difficult to generalise from this result, as it may
depend on how the lists of factors are compiled by the researchers
(for example Stubbersfield et al. 2017, considered ‘emotional bias’
as one of the possible features of urban legends, while here
‘negativity’ and ‘positivity’ were considered as a general property
of the content).
This analysis suggests a few general considerations on the
spread of online misinformation. First, articles concerning poli-
tical misinformation, while abundant, were still technically a
minority in the sample considered (40% of the articles). Different
sampling methods could, of course, give different results, but this
figure is consistent with the idea that online misinformation is not
necessarily political misinformation. While there may be good
reasons to focus the attention to the possible risks that the spread
of political ‘fake news’ online entails, it may also be conceivable
that the danger of misinformation online has been overstated by
previous research, by artificially limiting the breadth of the phe-
nomenon on explicitly malicious political articles (similar con-
clusions on the overestimation of the effect of political
misinformation are reached, for example, in Allcott and Gen-
tzkow, 2017 and Guess et al. 2018).
In addition, political misinformation seems to have peculiar
differences with respect to non-political one. Political mis-
information can thrive online also because it possesses some of
the features considered here cognitively attractive (think about
the notorious ‘Pizzagate’, a debunked conspiracy theory accord-
ing to which several high-level officials of US Democratic Party
were involved in a pedophilia ring in a pizza parlor, Snopes,
2016). In the sample analysed, however, an article classified as
being about politics was three times less likely than a non-political
article to have a cognitive preference other than ‘presence of
celebrities’ or ‘social’.
Second, is there any specificity of the spreading of online
misinformation? Various reasons have been proposed to explain
why misinformation should thrive online (as opposed to offline),
including the fact that everybody can quickly and cheaply spread
information, that digital media make easier to find other indivi-
duals confirming incorrect information, that online interactions
can preserve anonymity (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) and that
search engines, and especially social media algorithms, are opti-
mised for (shallow) engagement, giving disproportionate weight
to ‘like’ and previous traffic (Chakraborty et al. 2016). This
analysis points to the fact that, however, the same features that
make urban legends, fiction, and in fact any narrative, culturally
attractive also operate for online misinformation. While this does
not exclude that specific mechanisms favour online spreading of
misinformation, it suggests that to better understand them, some
knowledge of why some narratives are attractive and others are
not can be useful.
An interesting aspect of digital media is however that they
provide a cheap, fast, and easy support for high fidelity trans-
mission. In the majority of cases—think about a social media
‘share’—transmission is virtually replication of a message that
hardly requires an active role from the individuals involved,
besides a motivation to share it (Acerbi, 2016). The experiments
considered in cultural evolution and cognitive anthropology
generally involve the so-called ‘transmission chain’ methodology,
where participants listen to a narrative, and then they need to
remember and reproduce it. Few studies have investigated
transmission chains with features comparable to online trans-
mission and considered situations in which participants did not
need to recall and reproduce the transmitted material, but simply
choose what they wanted to read or what they wanted to transmit
(see e.g., Eriksson and Coultas, 2014; Stubbersfield et al. 2015;
Mercier et al., 2018; Stubbersfield et al. 2018; van Leeuwen et al.,
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2018). A review of the differences between the habitual modality
of cultural transmission, which involves cognitive aspects like
comprehension, memory, and verbal or written reproductions,
and digitally-mediated cultural transmission represents an inter-
esting topic for future studies.
In this analysis I considered ‘misinformation’ as anything that
was published by websites identified as spreading misinforma-
tion. Sure, misinformation is a general label that covers various
phenomena. Non-truthful news can be anything from poor and
unintentionally misleading report, ‘fake news’ explicitly aimed at
political propaganda, or even satire. The motivations to share
political conspiracies are different from the motivations to share
a ‘news’ about a morgue employee cremated by mistake (Peter-
sen et al., 2018). Individuals can be aware of sharing satirical
news, so that quantitative assessments of diffusion of fake news
could possibly be inflated by the conscious diffusion of satire.
The unifying theme here is that misinformation is less con-
strained by the need to be consistent with reality with respect to
truthful information. In this respect, misinformation can be
designed (as commented before, this does not need to be a
conscious process) to appeal cognitive preferences more than
truthful information can. If there is any advantage for mis-
information, this could be one. This perspective differs starkly
from the widespread idea that misinformation is low-quality
information that succeeds in spreading because of shortcomings
of digital media (Del Vicario et al. 2016; Qiu et al. 2017). Quite
the opposite, misinformation, or at least some of it, is very high-
quality information. The difference is that ‘quality’ is not about
truthfulness, but about how it fits with our cognitive
predispositions.
Finally, this study represents an exploratory, descriptive, ana-
lysis, mainly aimed to illustrate the possibility that cognitive
factors can contribute to our understanding of the spreading of
misinformation. Future works should test specific hypotheses,
such as comparing false and real news with respect to the pre-
sence of cognitively appealing features, or examining how these
features contribute to the relative success of each article. In
addition, topic modelling techniques could be used to investigate
whether the same attractive features could be automatically
detected, allowing to expand the sample studied.
Data availability
The full coding results and the dataset used for this analysis, including (i) the list of the
26 websites sampled, (ii) the 260 links to the articles coded, and (iii) the full texts of the
260 articles are available in an Open Science Framework repository: https://osf.io/78vhn/
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